Abstract: Tappolet (2005) has defended the perceptual account of emotion against a problem which some have raised against it, stemming from the phenomenon of ambivalent emotions. According to Tappolet, we can explain cases of ambivalent emotions unproblematically. To persuade us of this, she draws our attention to circumstances in which it seems entirely appropriate to have conflicting emotions with respect to the same situation. On her perceptual account of emotions, in such situations our emotions disclose two values, e.g., danger and attractiveness, at the same time. My aim here is to defend Tappolet by expanding on the considerations she adduces. In order to do this, I utilize Prinz's notion of "valence". Using this terminology, I shall show that the undeniable co-instantiation of emotions that are our intuitions classifies as "contrary", for example, fear and attraction does not actually constitute a contradiction.
I
Christine Tappolet (2005) provides an argument for the perceptual account of emotion against a problem which some have raised against it, namely the existence of ambivalent emotions.
1 She says we can explain cases of ambivalent emotions unproblematically. She does this by drawing our attention to circumstances in which it seems entirely appropriate to have conflicting emotions with respect to the same situation. On her perceptual account of emotions, in such situations our emotions disclose two values, e.g., danger and attractiveness, at the same time. Adam Morton (2002) argues that emotions are capable of something very like truth, but better described as accuracy. Literal emotional truth, Morton argues, is "too cheap". In order to show this, Morton considers the problem implicated by the perceptual account of emotions by raising the question of whether two contrary emotions, for example, fear and delight, can both be present in a single subject. Morton's argument can be summarised as follows: (1) Fear and delight are emotions that are incompatible, though we can oscillate between them. (2) Both fear and attraction might be equally accurate with respect to the same situation S. If this were right, we could say that (3) situation S can be both dangerous and attractive.
However, according to Morton, if this were true, "as De Sousa would put it, following Tappolet (2000) , the values of danger and of attractiveness are both present." Morton suggests that "we shouldn't count them as truths, as it would be a strange kind of truth, such that having it committed one also to falsity." Hence, Morton claims that (4) "to fear is to take as not attractive" (2002, .
If Morton's argument is right, Tappolet argues, the perceptual account of emotion might be rejected. This is because the perceptual account entails that "if fear is appropriate with respect to a situation, then it is dangerous, and if attraction is appropriate to a situation, then it is attractive" (2005, 230) . However, Tappolet holds that if we can explain how fear and attraction are mutually exclusive, the perceptual account of emotion can avoid the alleged difficulty. Morton also acknowledges this, and his solution to this problem is as follows: at earlier stages of development, it is not possible to instantiate emotions such as fear and attraction at the same time, even though the situation may possess both the properties of fearfulness and attractiveness. However, as we develop and become more sophisticated, he claims we become capable of manifesting "subtle emotions", such as "delighted horror" which reveal both properties of the situation simultaneously (2002, . However, if perceptual theorists accept this idea, they should clarify what the formal object of such "subtle emotions", namely, "delighted horror" would be. Is it "the attractiveness of danger" or "the dangerousness of the attractiveness of some objects"? It would seem that perceptual theorists cannot simply answer this question. This is because there can be many different ways in which these subtle emotions can manifest both the properties involved, and that these simply constitute different sorts of mixed emotions. Insofar as each one is different, each would then have a different formal object. Since this might make for excessive complications, in this paper, I only focus on Tappolet's solution as simpler. Tappolet presents an alternative way to meet this challenge without presuming the existence of Morton's "subtle emotions."
In order to provide an alternative view to Morton's, Tappolet asks us to imagine that you are walking along a dangerous mountain path. Upon reaching a particularly dangerous section, you develop a certain set of emotions. First, you become terrified as the next few steps might lead to your speedy and painful death. Second, you are strongly attracted to making the next few steps as completing the walk would be an exciting thing to accomplish (c.f. Tappolet 2005, 230) .
If somebody feels these two contrary emotions at the same time, do we have to say that the subject is in a state of conflict? If we assume that the perceptual account is correct, how can the perceptual theorist explain this kind of ambivalent emotion? In order to lend support to the idea that ambivalent emotions do not make for contradiction, Tappolet provides the following argument:
(1) The properties of danger and attractiveness are both disclosed as present. (2) The emotions cannot be regarded as truth-disclosing, if it is the case that dangerousness and attractiveness are incompatible properties that cannot be ascribed to the same situation S. (3) However, the example shows that such properties may, in fact, co-exist. (4) Therefore, emotions can unproblematically be regarded as truth-disclosing.
The central issue is whether danger and attractiveness are mutually exclusive or not. In order to give an answer to this question, she develops her view as follows. She claims that one's emotions can tune into one or to two aspects of a present or future situation, for example, its danger and its attractiveness. "Fear and, in this case, accurate awareness of the danger, tends to come with the thought that you should not go further, while the excitement and your attraction pushes you forward." If this is true, something can unproblematically be both attractive in one respect (as a challenge to one's limits, for example), while unattractive in another respect (as dangerous). Thus, she argues that our ordinary emotions of fear and attraction do not constitute a contradiction (2005, .
Given this, I argue that in order for Tappolet's argument to be powerful, her claim, that emotions can tune into two compatible aspects of situations, should be supplemented. Thus, in defence of her argument, in this paper, I expand on Tappolet's considerations. In order to do this, I utilize Prinz's notion of "valence". Using this terminology, the difference between negative and positive emotions is a difference in "valence".
2 (See Prinz 2004, 161) .
II

Let us look more closely at what this concept means. Prinz explains as follows.
The brain contains a pair of inner reinforcers. These are states that get associated with representations of stimuli. Primary reinforcers are stimuli that have been genetically associated with inner reinforcers, and secondary reinforcers are stimuli for which the association is learned. These inner reinforcers are valence markers. A negatively valent state is one that includes an inner negative reinforcer (INR) and a positively valent state is one that includes an inner positive reinforcer (IPR) (Prinz 2004, 173) .
Furthermore these IPRs and INRs, according to Prinz, act as "inner imperatives." The former compels us toward more of something, while the latter, an INR, compels us to draw back from something. We wish to prolong positive emotions, and avoid negative emotions. Thus, if we apply this model to the mountaineering case, we can say as follows: if you are afraid of making the next steps, then you will recognize that the imperative to avoid such states is best followed by vacating the area. Correspondingly, if you are attracted to making the steps, then you will recognize that the imperative to have more of this state requires us to take these steps: overcoming your limit. Hence, Prinz could explain our mountaineering case by identifying valence with inner reinforcers. According to him, "negative emotions encourage us to withdraw from situations that elicit them, and positive emotions encourage us to seek out the situations that elicit them" (ibid., 174). Prinz argues that identifying valence with inner reinforcers accounts for the fact that emotions sometimes impel approach or withdrawal.
In this way Prinz could explain whether danger and attractiveness are mutually exclusive or not. Hence, Prinz would say that danger and attractiveness can both be present, since according to him, "valence and appraisal hang together harmoniously." He could present the way in which both can be present as follows: "Appraisals represent relations that bear on well-being, but they do not represent such relations as bearing on well-being. Fear, for example, represents danger, but it does not represent the fact that danger is something that is undesirable." Thus, it is quite possible to be unmoved or unaffected by danger. Appraisals represent things that concern us, but they do not represent the fact that they concern us. This is why valence makers are significant. "Emotions without appraisals would lack content, and emotions without valence would have no punch" (Prinz 2004, 178) . Now in our mountaineering case, the person may think that making a few more steps has benefits that prevail over the risks, as it would be a challenge to his or her limits, for instance. This discovery could convert fear into a positive emotion under the circumstances, which would explain the adventurous behaviour. When the person reaches the dangerous section, he at first feels extreme terror, but the fear is followed by giddy excitement. Hence, we can say that a positively reinforcing emotion can lead to an overriding negative upshot, and vice versa.
III
Given this, we can say, as Tappolet notes, that "our ordinary emotions of fear and attraction do not make for a contradiction even on the assumption that the perceptual account is correct" (2005, 231) . If my argument so far is right, cases of ambivalent emotions do not prove that perceptual theory of emotion is incorrect. Rather they show the fact that our emotional dispositions are far more complicated and varied. In order to appreciate the complexity of emotions, we should consider what De Sousa (2002) calls "axiological holism" which "stipulates that we do not apprehend value in discrete units but only in the light of a complex of factors that transcend individual experience"(ibid., 225). Among these factors are biological facts, social norms, and "paradigm scenarios" of individual biography. Yet none of them alone constitutes the appropriateness of emotions. …"instead it is the totality of all these factors-biological facts, social, personal, and more-that may properly be confronted with one another in the hope of arriving at something like reflective equilibrium" (De Sousa 2004, 74) . In this regard, we can say that in evaluating emotion as in science, we are all on Neurath's raft, rebuilding while afloat (Prinz 2007, 289) . The similarity between these lies in the fact that neither has any foundational certainties. Rather both have degrees of centrality in a web of belief. Hence the appropriateness of a person's emotions can only be found through considering all these factors.
